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Bilinear pairingAbstract The concept of aggregate signcryption was ﬁrst introduced in 2009 by Selvi et al.
[Identity based aggregate signcryption schemes, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5922 LNCS,
2009, pp. 378–397]. The aggregation process of these schemes reduces the amount of exchanged
information and is particularly useful in low-bandwidth communication networks and computa-
tionally-restricted environments such as wireless sensor networks. Selvi et al.’s scheme is in the
identity-based setting and suffers from the key escrow problem. The goal of this paper is to over-
come this problem and propose a suitable security model for aggregate signcryption in the certiﬁ-
cateless setting. We further propose a concrete certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption scheme which is
based on Barbosa and Farshim’s certiﬁcateless signcryption scheme [Certiﬁcateless signcryption. In:
M. Abe, V. Gligor (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security (ASIACCS-08), ACM, New York. pp. 369–372]. We then prove the
security of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model under the gap Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman
and computational Difﬁe–Hellman intractability assumptions.
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Among important cryptographic primitives, one can name
encryption and signature schemes. Signcryption is another
cryptographic primitive that simultaneously achieves thesecurity objectives of both encryption and signatures and has
a lower computational cost and communication overhead than
the sign-then-encrypt approach. Consider a situation in which
a set of n distinct users fuigni¼1 wants to send messages fmigni¼1
to a designated recipient (R). The signcryption primitive can be
used to provide simultaneously conﬁdentiality for the senders
fuigni¼1 and authenticity for the receiverR. In this scenario,
the messages are signcrypted as fcigni¼1 and then sent to
R. The recipient ﬁrst veriﬁes if the received ciphertexts are sign-
crypted by fuigni¼1 and then decrypts them to obtain fmigni¼1.
Therefore, it is desirable to shorten the amount of exchanged
information and to reduce the computational complexity of
the veriﬁcation process. These are particularly crucial in
low-bandwidth communication networks or computationally
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an algorithm to efﬁciently aggregate fcigni¼1 into a single
ciphertext c in such a way that the recipient R is able to do
the following:
(1) verify that c is signcrypted by fuigni¼1 and
(2) extract fmigni¼1 from c.
Aggregate signcryption schemes can be applied in services
such as online polling, online banking, e-auction, routing sce-
narios, trafﬁc management systems, etc. As an example, we
demonstrate how we can apply an aggregate signcryption
scheme to improve an e-auction system:
Consider an e-auction event. The bidders want to ensure
that their proposals are hidden, and only the contracting
authority will be able to view their proposals. The contracting
authority would also want to ensure that this is a valid pro-
posal by a valid bidder. In situations like this, we can employ
the signcryption primitive, which provides both conﬁdentiality
for the senders and authentication to the receiver. The con-
tracting authority will be a secure device, but the computa-
tional power of the device might be limited. Providing high
security and high computational power results in a huge cost
demand. The security of such devices cannot be relaxed, and
thus, by reducing the computation power, one can greatly
reduce the cost involved. Hence, with limited computational
power, a contracting authority will ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to ver-
ify the authenticity of each and every proposal separately (as it
is possible for malicious bidders to contribute to bidding). By
using aggregate signcryption, the contracting authority will
easily be able to verify the authenticity of all of the proposals
using a single veriﬁcation step. As one part of all of the sign-
cryptions is aggregated, the bandwidth is also saved. Thus,
aggregate signcryption can play a very important role in this
scenario. After verifying the proposals, the contracting author-
ity outputs the bidder with the minimum proposal as the
winner.
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the certiﬁcate-
less setting and propose a suitable security model for certiﬁ-
cateless aggregate signcryption schemes (CLASC). We
outline in detail the framework of an aggregate signcryption
scheme in the certiﬁcateless public key setting. We further pro-
pose a CLASC scheme, which we prove to be secure in the ran-
dom oracle model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
related works is summarized. Section 3 introduces preliminary
material. In Section 4, we introduce the formal deﬁnition of the
security model of CLASC schemes. In Section 5, we describe
the proposed CLASC scheme, and in Section 6, we analyze
it. Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 7.
2. Related works
Certiﬁcateless cryptography, put forward ﬁrst by Al-riyami
and Paterson (2003), can be considered as an intermediate
solution to overcome the issues in traditional public key infra-
structure (PKI) and identity-based public key cryptography
(ID-PKC). Whereas a trusted authority is needed in traditional
PKI to bind the identity of an entity to his public key,
ID-PKC, introduced by Shamir (1984), requires a trusted
private key generator (PKG) to generate the private keys ofusers based on their identities. Therefore, the certiﬁcate man-
agement problem in the public-key setting is actually replaced
by the key escrow problem.
In certiﬁcateless public key cryptography, we still employ a
third party, called the key generation center (KGC), to help
users generate their private keys. However, theKGCdoes not
have access to the ﬁnal private keys that are generated by
the users themselves (based on the partial private keys
obtained from the KGC and the secret information chosen
by the users). The public key of a user is computed from the
KGC’s public parameters and some information, private to
the user, and is published by the user himself.
There exists a vast number of encryption and digital signa-
ture schemes in certiﬁcateless cryptography. For more details
about such schemes, we refer the interested reader to Baek
et al. (2005), Hu et al. (2007), Long and Chen (2007), Zhang
and Zhang (2008), Duan (2008), Guoyan and Xiaoyun
(2009), Chang et al. (2009), Sun and Zhang (2010), Zhao
and Ye (2012), Tso et al. (2012), Seo et al. (2012), Zhang
and Mao (2012), Islam and Biswas (2013a,b).
Zheng (1997) proposed the concept of signcryption, which
has a lower computational cost and communication overhead
than the sign-then-encrypt approach. Zheng further proposed
a concrete signcryption scheme based on the discrete logarithm
problem. Identity-based signcryption schemes and the deﬁni-
tions of their security model dealing with the notions of
privacy and unforgeability are considered in Malone-Lee
(2002), Libert and Quisquater (2003), Boyen (2003) and
Chen and Malone-Lee (2005).
The ﬁrst certiﬁcateless signcryption (CLSC) scheme is pro-
posed by Barbosa and Farshim (2008). The authors claimed
that their scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Selvi
et al. (2009a) demonstrated that Barbosa and Farshim’s
scheme is existentially forgeable. Liu et al. (2010) proposed
another CLSC scheme and claimed that it is secure in the stan-
dard model. However, Weng et al. (2011) and Miao et al.
(2013) demonstrated that Liu et. al.’s scheme is completely
insecure.
The concept of an aggregate signcryption scheme was intro-
duced in Selvi et al. (2009b). The authors also deﬁned a suit-
able security model for identity-based aggregate signcryption
schemes and proposed examples that are proved to be secure
in the random oracle model. We also note that aggregate sig-
nature schemes have been discussed in the literature for a
while. The interested readers can ﬁnd more such materials in
Boneh et al. (2003), Lysyanskaya et al. (2004), Xu et al.
(2005), Cheng et al. (2006), Gentry and Ramzan (2006),
Zhang and Zhang (2009), Zhang et al. (2010) and Xiong
et al. (2013).
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we provide a brief review of preliminary mate-
rial including bilinear maps and some mathematical problems.
Let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a
multiplicative group of the same order. A map e:G1 · G1
ﬁ G2 is called a bilinear map if it satisﬁes the following
properties:
(1) Bilinearity: e(aP,bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q 2 G1 and
a; b 2 Zq.
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e(P,Q) „ 1.
(3) Computability: There exists an efﬁcient algorithm to
compute e(P,Q) for anyP,Q 2 G1.
Computational Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given a
generator P of an additive group G with orderq and (aP,bP)
for unknown a; b 2 Zq, compute abP.
Decisional Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (DBDH) Problem:
Given a generator P of an additive group G with orderqand
(aP,bP,cP,t) for unknown a; b; c 2 Zq, decide e(P,P)abc = t
or not.
Gap Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (GBDH) Problem: Given
(P,aP,bP,cP 2 G1) for some unknown a; b; c 2 Zq, compute
w= e(P,P)abc 2 G2 with the help of DBDH oracleODBDH.
Gap Difﬁe–Hellman (GDH0) Problem: Given (P,aP,bP 2
G1) for some unknown a; b 2 Zq, compute abP 2 G1 with the
help of DBDH oracleODBDH.4. Certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption schemes
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the framework of a certiﬁcateless
aggregate signcryption scheme. We then propose a formal
deﬁnition for the security model of CLASC schemes.4.1. Framework of CLASC schemes
The participants involved in a certiﬁcateless aggregate sign-
cryption scheme consist of a key generation center (KGC),
an aggregating set u of n users (fuigni¼1Þ, a receiver uR and an
aggregate signcryption generator. The probabilistic polyno-
mial-time (PPT) algorithms: Setup, PartialPrivateKeyExtract,
UserKeyGenerate, Signcrypt, Aggregate, AggregateVerify
and AggregateUnsigncrypt should also be deﬁned. The
description of each algorithm is as follows:
Setup: This algorithm takes as input a security parameter l
and returns params (system parameters) and a randomly cho-
sen master secret key msk. The KGC carries out the algorithm
and publishes params. msk will be kept secret.
PartialPrivateKeyExtract: This algorithm takes as input
params, msk and an identity IDu 2 {0,1}* of an entity u, and
returns a partial private key Du. The KGC carries out the algo-
rithm to generate the partial private key Du and sends Du to the
corresponding owner u via a secure channel.
UserKeyGenerate: This algorithm takes params and an
entity’s identity IDu as input and returns a randomly chosen
secret value xu and a corresponding public key Pu for the
entity. The entity u runs the algorithm to generate his public
key and then distributes the public key Pu without being
certiﬁed.
Signcrypt: An algorithm run by each user ui in an aggregat-
ing setu. ui’s inputs are the system parameters params, some
state information D, a message Mi, his identity IDi, his corre-
sponding public key Pi, his private key (xi,Di), the identity of
the receiver IDR and his corresponding public key PR. This
algorithm outputs a ciphertext ci. This is a probabilistic
algorithm.
Aggregate: An algorithm run by the aggregate signcryption
generator that takes as inputs an aggregating set u of n users
ðfuigni¼1Þ, some state information D, the identity IDi of eachsender ui, the corresponding public key Pi of each ui, and a
ciphertext ci on a messageMi under the identity IDi and public
key Pi for each user ui 2 u ciphered with the state information
D to a user with identity IDR and the corresponding public key
PR. The output of this algorithm is an aggregate ciphertext c
on messages fMigni¼1, where the aggregate signcryption gener-
ator does not know Mis.
AggregateVerify: This algorithm takes as input an aggre-
gating set u of n users fuigni¼1, the identity IDi and the corre-
sponding public key Pi of each user ui, the identity of the
receiver IDR and his corresponding public key PR, the state
information D and an aggregate ciphertext c. It outputs true
if the aggregate signcryption is valid or false otherwise.
AggregateUnsigncrypt: This algorithm takes an aggregate
ciphertext c, the state information D, the receiver’s full private
key (xR,DR), his identity IDR and his public key PR, and the
senders’ identities fIDigni¼1 and corresponding public keys
fPigni¼1 as input and outputs a set of n plaintexts fMigni¼1. Typ-
ically, the AggregateUnsigncrypt algorithm is a deterministic
algorithm.
As in Gentry and Ramzan (2006), Zhang and Zhang (2009)
and Zhang et al. (2010), in an aggregating set, all of the users
must use the same (unique) state information D in the Sign-
crypt algorithm. For such a D, one can choose the current
time, some part of the system parameters or other feasible
information.4.2. The proposed security model for certiﬁcateless aggregate
signcryption schemes
The security model for certiﬁcateless signcryption schemes is
introduced by Barbosa and Farshim (2008). In this section,
we propose a security model for certiﬁcateless aggregate sign-
cryption schemes. The ciphertext indistinguishability and the
existential unforgeability security models are used to capture
the conﬁdentiality and authenticity requirements, respectively.
As for the adversarial model, we follow the common approach
in the certiﬁcateless setting, which considers two types of
adversaries. A Type I adversary AI who does not have access
to the master secret key but can replace the public key of
any entity with another value and a Type II Adversary AII
who has access to the master secret key but is unable to per-
form public key replacement. We now deﬁne the required secu-
rity games to capture.
4.2.1. Conﬁdentiality requirement
The conﬁdentiality property is deﬁned based on the concept of
indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptively chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). We deﬁne the following two
games against Type I and Type II adversaries.
Game I. The game is performed by a challenger C and a
Type I adversary AI.
 Initialization. C runs the Setup algorithm to generate a mas-
ter secret key msk and the public system parameters params.
C keeps msk secret and gives params to AI. Note that AI
does not know msk.
 Phase 1. A polynomially bounded number of the following
queries is performed by AI. The queries can be made adap-
tively so that answers to the previous queries might affect
subsequent ones.
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requests u’s public key, C responds with the public key Pu
for the identity.
 ExtractPartialPrivateKey. When AI supplies an identity
IDu and requests u’s partial private key, C responds
with the partial private key Du for the identity.
 ReplacePublicKey.When AI supplies an identity IDu and
a new valid public key value P 0u; C replaces the current
public key value with the value P 0u.
 ExtractSecretValue.When AI requests the secret value of
an identity IDu, the challenger returns the secret value xu
of u. The public key of u should not have been replaced
byAI.
 Signcrypt. When AI submits a sender with an identity
IDS, a receiver with an identity IDR, a message M and
some state information D to the challenger, C responds
by running the Signcrypt algorithm on the message M,
the state information D, the sender’s private key (DS,xS )
and the receiver’s public key PR.
 AggregateUnsigncrypt. When AI submits an aggregate
ciphertext c, some state information D, senders with id-
entities fIDigni¼1 and a receiver with the identity IDR, C
checks the validity of c and if it is a valid ciphertext, then
C returns the result of running the AggregateUnsign-
crypt algorithm on the ciphertext c, the state information
D, the receiver’s private key (DR,xR) and the senders’
public keys fP igni¼1.
 Challenge.When Phase 1 ends, the adversary outputs n+ 1
distinct identities fIDi gni¼1, IDR, some state information D*
and two sets of n messages M0 ¼ m0i
 n
i¼1; M

1 ¼ m1i
 n
i¼1.
Now, a bit l is randomly chosen by C who then produces
c* as the aggregate signcryption of messages Ml using the
state information D*, the private keys corresponding to
IDi
 n
i¼1 and the public key and the identity of u

R. The chal-
lenger returns c* to the adversary.
 Phase 2. The adversary can continue to probe the challenger
as in Phase 1.
 Response. The adversary returns a bit l0.
We say that the adversary wins the game if l0 = l, subject
to the following conditions:
(1) AI never queries the partial private key for ID

R.
(2) AI cannot make an AggregateUnsigncrypt query on c
*
under IDR and ID
0
i
 n
i¼1 where at least for one
i; IDi ¼ ID0i. The only exception is when the public key
P i of all of the senders ID

j with ID

j ¼ ID0j or that of
the receiver P R used to signcrypt M

l have been replaced
after the challenge was issued.
The advantage of AI is deﬁned as follows:
AdvINDCLASCCCA2AI ¼ j2Pr½l ¼ l0  1j;
where Pr[l= l0] denotes the probability that l = l0.
Game II. The game is performed by a challenger C and a
Type II adversary AII.
 Initialization. C ﬁrst generates (params, msk) and outputs
them to AII. Phase 1. AII may adaptively make a polynomially bounded
number of queries as in Game I. The only constraint is that
AII cannot replace any public keys. Note that since AII
knows the master secret key, it can compute the partial pri-
vate key of any identity.
 Challenge.When Phase 1 ends, the adversary outputs n+ 1
distinct identities IDi
 n
i¼1; ID

R, some state information D
*
and two sets of n messages M0 ¼ m0i
 n
i¼1; M

1 ¼ m1i
 n
i¼1.
Now, a bit l is randomly chosen by C who then produces
c* as the aggregate signcryption of messages Ml using the
state information D*, the private keys corresponding to
IDi
 n
i¼1 and the public key of u

R. The challenger returns
c* to the adversary.
 Phase 2. The adversary can continue to probe the challenger
as in Phase 1.
 Response. The adversary returns a bit l0.
We say that the adversary wins the game if l= l0, and the
following constraints are fulﬁlled:
(1) AII never queries the secret value for the challenge iden-
tity IDR.
(2) In Phase 2, AII cannot make an AggregateUnsigncrypt
query for the challenge ciphertext c* under IDR and
fID0igni¼1, where at least for one i, IDi ¼ ID0i.
As in Game I, the advantage of AII is deﬁned as follows:
AdvINDCLASCCCA2AII ¼ j2Pr½l ¼ l0  1j:
Deﬁnition 1. A CLASC scheme is semantically secure under
adaptively chosen ciphertext attack if no PPT adversary (of
either Type) has a non-negligible advantage in Game I or
Game II.
Note that as the adversaries can access the private keys of
all of the senders, the above deﬁnition of security assures that
conﬁdentiality is preserved even if these keys are compromised,
and, therefore, insider security is guaranteed.
4.2.2. Authenticity requirement
The authenticity property is deﬁned based on existential
unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA)
and is captured by the following two games against Type I
and Type II adversaries.
Game III. The game is performed by a challenger C and a
Type I adversary AI.
 Setup. C runs the Setup algorithm and takes as input a secu-
rity parameter to obtain a master secret key and the system
parameters params. C then sends params to the adversary AI
while keeping the master secret key secret.
 Phase 1. AI may adaptively make a polynomially bounded
number of queries as in Game I.
 Forgery. AI outputs n+ 1 users fui gni¼1 and uR, with identi-
ties fIDi gni¼1 and IDR and corresponding public keys fP i gni¼1
and P R, n messages fMi gni¼1, some state information D* and
an aggregate ciphertext c*.
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(1) c* is a valid aggregate ciphertext associated with the state
information D*, senders’ identities IDi
 n
i¼1 and corre-
sponding public keys P i
 n
i¼1, the receiver’s identity
IDR and the corresponding public key P

R.
(2) The partial private key of at least one of the members of
the aggregating set, say ID1, has not been queried during
the ExtractPartialPrivateKey queries. We further
require that signcryption of M1;D
; ID1; ID

R
 
has never
been queried during the Signcrypt queries.
Game IV. The game is performed by a challenger C and a
Type II adversary AII.
 Setup. C runs the Setup algorithm to generate params and
msk and then sends them to AII as in Game II.
 Phase 1. AII’s queries are identical to those of Game II.
 Forgery. AII outputs n+ 1 users fui gni¼1 and uR, with iden-
tities fIDi gni¼1 and IDR, and corresponding public keys
fP i gni¼1 and P R, n messages fMi gni¼1, some state information
D* and an aggregate ciphertext c*.
We say that AII wins Game IV, iff
(1) c* is a valid aggregate ciphertext associated with the state
information D*, senders’ identities fIDi gni¼1 and the cor-
responding public keys fP i gni¼1, the receiver’s identity
IDR and the corresponding public key P

R.
(2) One of the identities, without loss of generality, say ID1
in the set of signcrypters has not been submitted during
the ExtractSecretValue queries and signcryption of
M1;D
; ID1; ID

R
 
has never been queried during the
Signcrypt queries.Deﬁnition 2. A CLASC scheme is existentially unforgeable
under adaptively chosen message attacks if no PPT adversary
(of either Type) has a non-negligible advantage in the Game
III or the Game IV.
Note that as the adversaries can access the private key of
the receiver, the above deﬁnition of security assures that
unforgeability is preserved even if this key is compromised,
and, therefore, insider security is guaranteed.
5. The proposed certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption scheme
In this section, we present a concrete CLASC scheme that is
based on the scheme of Barbosa and Farshim (2008), which
uses the Encrypt-then-Sign approach with shared randomness
and public veriﬁability of the ciphertext. In Selvi et al. (2009a),
it is demonstrated that since the scheme of Barbosa and
Farshim (2008) does not bind the receiver’s identity to the sig-
nature, then it is existentially forgeable. Therefore, we have to
make some modiﬁcations to address this problem. The details
of the proposed scheme are as follows.
 Setup: performed by KGC.
 Input: the security parameter l.
 Process:(1) choose a cyclic additive group G1 generated by P
of prime order q,(2) choose a cyclic multiplicative group G2 of the
same order and a bilinear map e:G1 · G1ﬁ G2,
(3) choose a random number s 2 Zq as the master
secret key and set Mpk= sP,
(4) choose cryptographic hash functions H1:{0,1}
*ﬁ
G1,H2: {0,1}
*ﬁ {0,1}k, H3:{0,1}*ﬁ G1,H4:{0,1}*
ﬁ G1.
 Output: the master secret key s, which will be secured by
KGCand the system parameters params= (G1,G2,e,P,
Mpk,H1,H2,H3,H4), which is published.
 PartialPrivateKeyExtract: performed by KGC.
 Input: params, master secret key s and a user’s identity
IDi 2 {0,1}*.
 Process:(1) compute Qi =H1(IDi),
(2) compute Di = sQi.
 Output: the partial private key Di, which is sent securely
to the user with identity IDi.
 UserKeyGenerate: performed by each user of the system.
 Input: user’s identity IDi.
 Process:(1) select a random number xi 2 Zq,
(2) compute Pi = xiP as the user’s public key.
 Output: xi and Pi, of which the ﬁrst one will be secured
by this user, and the second one is published.
 Signcrypt: run by user ui.
 Input: ui’s identity IDi and his public/private key, the
receiver’s identity IDR and his public key, some state
information D and a message Mi.
 Process:(1) choose a random number ri 2 Zq and compute
Ui = riP, T i ¼ eðMpk;QRÞri ,
(2) compute hi = H2(Ui,Ti,riPR,IDR ,PR,D),
(3) compute Vi = hi ¯Mi,
(4) compute Hi = H3(Ui,Vi,IDi,Pi,IDR,PR),
(5) compute H0 = H4(D),
(6) compute Wi = Di + riHi + xiH
0.
 Output: ci = (Ui,Vi,Wi).
 Aggregate: performed by aggregate signcryption generator.
 Input: a collection of individual ciphertexts fci ¼ ðUi;
V i;W iÞgni¼1 generated by users with identity fIDigni¼1 to
a receiver with identity IDR under the same state infor-
mation D.
 Process: compute W ¼Pni¼1W i.
 Output: aggregate ciphertext c= (U1, . . . ,Un,
V1, . . . ,Vn,W).
 AggregateVerify: performed by an arbitrary entity.
 Input: an aggregate ciphertext c= (U1, . . . ,Un,V1,
. . . ,Vn,W) generated by n users fuigni¼1 with identities
fIDigni¼1 and corresponding public keys fP igni¼1 for a
receiver uR with identity IDR and the corresponding
public key PR using the same state information D.
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(1) compute Hi =H3(Ui,Vi,IDi,Pi,IDR,PR), For
i= 1, . . . ,n,
(2) compute H0 =H4(D),
(3) verify eðW ; P Þ¼?e Pni¼1Qi;Mpk Qni¼1eðHi;UiÞ
e H 0;
Pn
i¼1P i
 
.
 Output: true if the above equation holds, false otherwise.
 AggregateUnsigncrypt: performed by the receiver (if the
output of AggregateVerify algorithm is true).
 Input: the inputs of AggregateVerify algorithm and the
private key of the receiver (xR,DR).
 Process: for i= 1, . . . ,n:
(1) compute Ti = e(Ui,DR),
(2) compute hi = H2(Ui,Ti,xRUi,IDR,PR,D),
(3) compute Mi = Vi ¯ hi.
 Output: fMigni¼1.
Using the technique described in Al-riyami and Paterson
(2003), our scheme can easily achieve trust level 3.
6. Analysis of the proposed scheme
6.1. Correctness
The following equalities show the correctness of the veriﬁca-
tion algorithm:
eðW;PÞ ¼ e
Xn
i¼1
Wi;P
 !
¼ e
Xn
i¼1
Di þ riHi þ xiH0ð Þ;P
 !
¼ e
Xn
i¼1
sQi þ riHi þ xiH0ð Þ;P
 !
¼ e
Xn
i¼1
Qi;Mpk
 !Yn
i¼1
eðHi;UiÞe H0;
Xn
i¼1
Pi
 !
:6.2. Security analysis
Assuming that the CDH, GDH0 and GBDH problems are hard,
we now demonstrate the security of our CLASC scheme.
Theorem 1. The certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption scheme
of Section 5 is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack in the random oracle model.
This theorem follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. Assuming the intractability of GBDH problem, the
proposed CLASC scheme is secure against adversary AI during
Game I under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random
oracle model.
Proof. We suppose that a Type I adversary AI exists for our
scheme. We now demonstrate how to use AI to devise an algo-
rithm C that can solve the GBDH problem. h
We provide C with the GBDH challenge (P,aP,bP,cP) as
input. C sets Mpk= aP and sends G1,G2,e,P and Mpk to AI.C chooses a random number l 6 qH1 as the challenge identity,
where qH1 is the maximum number of queries that AI could
place to H1 oracle. To solve the GBDH problem, C replies to
queries made by AI. In the following, we describe how C
responds to these queries. Note that to avoid collision and con-
sistently respond to these queries, C has to maintain some lists,
which are all initially empty (this assumption holds throughout
the rest of the paper).
H1 queries: On the i-th (non-repeated) query ID, if i „ l,
then C chooses r 2 Zq uniformly at random and sets QID = rP.
It then adds (i,ID,r) to a list L1 and returns QID. Otherwise, it
returns QID = bP and adds (l,ID,^) to L1, where ^ is an
empty string. We denote by IDl, the l-th non-repeated identity
queried to this oracle.
ExtractPartialPrivateKey queries: For each new query ID,
C inputs ID to H1 and obtains (i,ID,r). If i= l, then C aborts.
Otherwise, C returns D= raP.
ExtractSecretValue queries: On input ID, C searches LK for
the entry (ID,PK,x) corresponding to ID. If no entry is found,
C generates the key pair (PK,x) and adds the tuple (ID,PK,x)
to the list. In both cases, C returnsx.
RequestPublicKey queries: On input ID, C searches LK for
the entry (ID,PK,x) corresponding to ID. If no entry is found,
C generates the key pair (PK,x) and adds the tuple (ID,PK,x)
to the list. C then returns PK.
ReplacePublicKey queries: On input (ID,PK), C inserts/
updates LK with the tuple (ID,PK,^).
H3 queries: On input (U,V,ID,PK,ID
0,PK0), C searches L3 for
the entry (U,V,ID,PK,ID0,PK0,t,tP). If no entry is found, C gener-
ates a random value t in Zq. It then inserts the tuple (U,V,ID,
PK,ID0,PK0,t,tP) in the list L3. In both cases, C returns tP.
H4 queries: On input (D), C searches L4 for the entry
(D,s,sP). If no entry is found, C generates a random value s
in Zq. It then inserts the tuple (D,s,sP) in the list L4. In both
cases, C returns sP.
H2 queries: On input (U,T,R,ID,PK,D), C proceeds as
follows:
(1) C checks if the decision bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman oracle
returns 1 when queried with one of the tuples
faP ; bP ; dicP ; Tgni¼1. If this is the case, C returns T d
1
i as
the solution for the instance of the GBDH problem
and stops.
(2) C goes through the list L2 with entries
(U,T,R,ID,PK,D,h) for different values of h. If such a
tuple exists, it returns h. Otherwise, it calls the decision
bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman oracle on the tuple (aP,H1(-
ID),U,T). If it returns 1 and e(U,PK) = e(P,R), then it
returns a random value h and updates the list L2 with
a tuple containing the input and h.
Signcrypt queries: For each new query (m,D,IDi, ID0), C
proceeds as follows:
 If IDi „ IDl, C signcrypts m as follow.
 If the public key of IDi has been replaced:(1) obtains PKi and PK
0 by calling RequestPublicKey
oracle on IDi and ID
0, respectively,
(2) chooses a random number r 2 Zq and computes
U= rP, T= e(Mpk,H1(ID
0))r,
(3) computes h= H2(U,T,rPK
0,ID0, PK0,D),
(4) computes V= h ¯ m,
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0, PK0),
(6) obtains (D,s,sP) by calling H4 oracle on D and
computes W= Di + rH+ sPKi (note that C
can obtain Di from ExtractPartialPrivateKey
oracle),
(7) returns c= (U,V,W).
 Otherwise, C signcrypts m in the usual manner by using
xi (obtained from the ExtractSecretValue oracle) and Di
(obtained from ExtractPartialPrivateKey oracle).
 If IDi = IDl (and hence ID0–IDlÞ, C performs the following:
(1) obtains PKi and PK
0 by calling RequestPublicKey
oracle on IDi and ID
0, respectively,
(2) generates two random values u; v 2 Zq and sets
U= vaP,
(3) calls H1 with ID
0 to obtain (j, ID0,r0) and computes
T= e(U,r0Mpk),
(4) obtains h by calling H2 on (U,T,R,ID
0, PK0,D) and
computes V= m ¯ h,
(5) deﬁnes the hash value H3(U,V,IDl,PKi, ID
0,PK0) as
H ¼ v1ðuP  QIDl Þ, aborting if such a H3 query has
been responded with a different value before. This
means that C updates the list L3 with (U,V,IDl,
PKi,ID
0,PK0,*,H).
(6) obtains (D,s,sP) by calling H4 oracle on D and sets
W= uaP+ sPKi and returns (U,V,W). Note that
this is a valid signcryption.
AggregateUnsigncrypt queries: For each new query
U1; . . . ;Un;V1; . . . ;Vn;W; fIDigni¼1; ID0;D
 
; C proceeds as
follows:
(1) It queries H1 and RequestPublicKey oracles with {ID1,
. . . ,IDn,ID
0} to obtain QID1 ; . . . ;QIDn ; QID0
 
and {PK1,
. . . ,PKn,PK
0}. C then executes AggregateVerify algo-
rithm and returns ^ if the veriﬁcation does not succeed.
(2) For i= 1, . . . ,n (we suppose that AI replaced the public
key of ID0; otherwise, response to this query is more
simple):
 If ID0–IDl; C performs the following:
(a) calculates Ti = e(rUi,Mpk), where (j,ID
0, r) is
obtained by calling H1 on ID
0,
(b) goes through L2 and looks for a tuple (Ui,Ti, *,
ID0,PK0,D,h). If such an entry exists, C decrypts
it using the hash value h. Otherwise, it places
the entry (Ui,Ti,*,ID
0,PK0, D,h) for a random
value h on the list L2 and decrypts using this h.
 If ID0 = IDl
(a) then the pairing cannot be calculated. To
return a consistent answer, C goes through L2
and looks for a tuple (Ui,*,*,ID
0,PK0,D,h). If
such an entry exists, C decrypts it using the
hash value h.
(b) If C reaches this point of execution, it places
the entry (Ui,*,*,ID
0,PK0,D, h) for a random
value h on the list L2 and decrypts using
this h. The symbol * denotes an unknown
value.Eventually, AI outputs two message sets M

0 ¼ M0i
 n
i¼1
and M1 ¼ M1i
 n
i¼1, some state information D
* and n+ 1
identities IDi
 n
i¼1 and ID

R. C places a query on H1 with input
IDR. If the index of ID

R is not l; C fails. Otherwise, it proceeds
to construct a challenge as follows. It obtains from LK the pub-
lic keys PKi
 n
i¼1 corresponding to ID

i
 n
i¼1. Then, it sets
Ui ¼ dicP
 n
i¼1 with randomly selected di 2 Zq
n on
i¼1
and
selects a random bit l. C obtains hash values fhigni¼1 from
the H2 oracle and sets V

i ¼ Mli  hi
n on
i¼1
. C then computes
Wi ¼ Di þ riHi þ xi H0 ¼ Di þ tiUi þ sPKi
 n
i¼1, where ti is
obtained from H3 oracle, s is obtained from H4 oracle, and
Di is calculated by calling the ExtractPartialPrivateKey oracle
on IDi . C now applies the Aggregate algorithm and sends the
output (i.e., c ¼ U1; . . . ;Un; V1; . . . ;Vn;W
 
) to AI. Note
that since IDi–ID

R
 n
i¼1, the ExtractPartialPrivateKey oracle
simulation always gives C the correct value of Di .
Queries made by AI during Phase 2 are treated as in Phase
1. Finally, AI will output the index of the message set, which he
thinks is signcrypted inside the challenge. Note that from
adversary’s viewpoint, each index i has the same probability,
and thus, the probability that the adversary outputs a particu-
lar identity is the same for all identities. If IDR ¼ IDl, the sim-
ulation is perfect unless the adversary queries H2 on one of the
challenge-related tuples Ui ;T

i ;R

i ; ID

R;PK

R;D
  n
i¼1. Given
that the hash function H2 is modeled as a random oracle, the
adversary will not have any advantage if one of these tuples
does not appear on L2. However, if this happens, C solves
the GBDH problem for the given input (due to the ﬁrst step
in the simulation of H2) with a probability dependent on the
advantage of AI.
Lemma 2. The proposed CLASC scheme is secure during Game
II, assuming that the CDH problem is hard in G1.
Proof. We suppose that a Type II adversary AII for our
scheme exists. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random
instance (P,aP,bP) of the CDH problem in G1. We now dem-
onstrate how C is able to use AII during Game II to compute
abP. h
C generates a master key pair (msk,Mpk) and sends G1,
G2,e,P,Mpk and msk to AII. It chooses an index l 6 qReqPK at
random, where qReqPK is the maximum number of queries that
AII could place to RequestPublicKey oracle. C answers to AII
queries as follows.
H1 queries: On the i-th non-repeated query ID, C chooses
r 2 Zq uniformly at random and sets QID = rP. It then adds
(ID,r) to the list L1 and returns QID.
RequestPublicKey queries: On the i-th non-repeated query
ID, if i–l; C generates a new key pair (x, PK), updates the
list LK with (i,ID,PK,x) and returns PK. If i= l, C returns
aP and adds (l,ID,aP, ^) to LK. From this point on, we
denote the l-th non-repeated identity queried to this oracle
with IDl.
ExtractSecretValue queries: For each new query ID, C calls
RequestPublicKey on ID to obtain (i,ID,PK,x). If i= l, C
aborts. Otherwise, it returns x.
H3 queries: On input ðU;V; ID;PK; ID0;PK0Þ; C searches L3
for the entry (U,V,ID,PK,ID0,PK0,t,tP). If no entry is found, C
Certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption 283generates a random value t in Zq, updates the list L3 with the
input, t and tP. In both cases, C returns tP.
H4queries: On input (D), C searches L4 for the entry
(D,s,sP). If no entry is found, C generates a random value s
in Zq. It then inserts the tuple (D,s,sP) in the list L4. In both
cases, C returns sP.
H2 queries: On input (U,T,R,ID,PK,D), C proceeds as
follows:
(1) Checks if e(aP,dibP) = e(P,R) for i= 1, . . . ,n. If so, C
returns d1i R and stops.
(2) Checks the list L2 for the tuple (U,T,R,ID,PK, D,h)
for some value of h. If such a tuple exists, C returns h
to AII. Otherwise, if e(U,mskH1(ID)) = T and
e(U,PK) = e(P,R); then, it returns a random value h
and updates the list L2 with a tuple containing the input
and h.
Signcrypt queries: For each new query (m,D,IDi,ID0), C
proceeds as follows:
 If IDi–IDl; C obtains the secret value xi from the Request-
PublicKey and signcrypts the message m in the usual way.
C returns the ciphertext to AII.
 If IDi = IDl, C then performs the following:
(1) obtains PKl and PK
0 by calling RequestPublicKey
oracle on IDl and ID
0, respectively.
(2) generates a random value r 2 Zq, sets U= rP and
calculates T= e(U,mskH1(ID
0)) and R= rPK0.
(3) calls H2 on (U,T,R,ID
0,PK0,D ), obtains h and com-
putes V= m ¯ h.
(4) obtains (D,s,sP) by calling H4 on D and computes
W= Dl + rH3(U,V,IDl,PKl,ID
0, PK0) + xlH4(D) =
Di + rH3(U,V,IDl,PKl, ID
0,PK0) + saP,
(5) returns (U,V,W).AggregateUnsigncrypt queries: For each new query ðU1; . . . ;
Un; V1; . . . ;Vn; W; fIDigni¼1; ID0;DÞ; C proceeds as follows:
(1) It executes the AggregateVerify algorithm after obtain-
ing QID1 ; . . . ;QIDn ; QID0
 
and {PK1, . . . ,PKn,PK
0} with
calls to H1 and RequestPublicKey oracles. It returns ^
if the veriﬁcation does not succeed.
(2) For i= 1, . . . ,n:
 If ID0 „ IDl, it unsigncrypts in the usual way.
 If ID0 = IDl, then
(a) It calculates Ti = e(Ui,r
0Mpk), where (ID0,r0) is
obtained from L1.
(b) C is unable to compute the correct value of R.
To answer the query consistently, C searches L2
looking for a tuple (Ui,Ti,R,IDl,PK
0,D,h), for
different values of R, such that e(Ui,PK
0) =
e(P,R). If such an entry exists, the correct
value of R is found, and C decrypts using h.
(c) If C reaches this point of execution, C places the
entry (Ui,Ti,*,ID
0,PK0, D,h) for a random value
h on list L2 and decrypts using this h.Eventually, AII outputs two message sets M

0 ¼ M0i
 n
i¼1
and M1 ¼ M1i
 n
i¼1, some state information D
* and n+ 1identities IDi
 n
i¼1 and ID

R. C places a query on H1 with input
IDR. If the index of ID

R is not l, C fails. Otherwise, it proceeds
to construct a challenge as follows. It obtains from LK the pub-
lic keys PKi
 n
i¼1 corresponding to ID

i
 n
i¼1. Then, it sets
Ui ¼ dibP with randomly selected di 2 Zq
n on
i¼1
and selects a
random bit l. C obtains hash values fhigni¼1 from the H2 oracle
and sets Vi ¼ Mli  hi. The components Wi are set to be
Di þ riHi þ xi H0 ¼ Di þ tidibPþ sPKi , where tis are obtained
from L3, s from L4 and D

i s by calling the ExtractPartialPri-
vateKey oracle on IDi s.
In the second phase, AII performs new queries, which are
treated in the same manner as Phase 1. At the end of the sim-
ulation, it will output the index of the message set, which he
thinks is signcrypted inside the challenge.
As before, all indices have the same probability from the
adversary’s viewpoint, and therefore, the probability that the
adversary outputs an identity IDl with index l is the same for
all identities. If IDR ¼ IDl, the simulation is perfect unless
the adversary queries H2 on one of the challenge-related tuples
Ui ;T

i ;R

i ; ID

R;PK

R;D
  n
i¼1. Since the hash function H2 is
modeled as a random oracle, the adversary will not have any
advantage if one of these tuples does not appear on L2. How-
ever, if this happens, C solves the CDH problem for the given
input (due to the ﬁrst step in the simulation of H2). Therefore,
if AII has any advantage in winning this game, C can solve
CDH problem with a probability dependent on the advantage
of AII.
Theorem 2. The proposed certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption
scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message
attack (EUF-CLASC-CMA) in the random oracle model under
the CDH intractability assumption and presence of a decision
bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman oracle.
This theorem follows Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. The proposed CLASC scheme is secure during Game
III, assuming that the GDH0 intractability assumption holds.
Proof. Let C be a GDH0 attacker who receives a random
instance (P,aP,bP) of the GDH0 problem in G1. Let AI be a
type I adversary who interacts with C as modeled in Game
III. We demonstrate how C may use AI to solve the GDH0
problem, i.e., to compute abP. h
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm of the proposed scheme
and sets Mpk= aP. It chooses a random number l 6 qH1 as
the challenge identity, where qH1 is the maximum number of
queries that AI could place to H1 oracle. It then sends G1
,G2,e,P and Mpk to AI. AI can make some queries (as
explained in Game I), and C answers these queries (as in lemma
1), except H2 queries, which are as follows:
H2 queries: On input ðU;T;R; ID;PK;DÞ; C checks if the
decisional bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman oracle returns 1 on
(U,Mpk,H1(ID),T), and checks e(U,PK) = e(R, P). If it is the
case, C checks the list L2 for the tuple (U,T,R,ID,PK,D,h) for
some value of h. If such a tuple exists, C returns h to AI; other-
wise, C randomly chooses h 2 {0,1}k and updates L2 with
(U,T,R,ID,PK,D,h). C also sends h to AI.
Eventually, AI returns a set of n+ 1 users with identities
ID1; . . . ; ID

n; ID

R
 
, the corresponding public keys PK1; . . . ;

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
Rg; n messages Mi
 n
i¼1, some state information D
* and
a forged aggregate ciphertext c ¼ U1; . . . ;Un; V1; . . . ;Vn;W
 
.
It is required that IDl 2 ID1; . . . ; IDn
 
. Given that each index i
has the same probability from the adversary’s viewpoint, all iden-
tities in the list have the same probability to get picked up. If this
event occurs, the simulation is perfect. Without loss of generality,
we let IDl ¼ ID1. In addition, the AggregateVerify algorithm
should return true on forged aggregate signcryption ciphertext,
namely:
eðW;PÞ ¼ e
Xn
i¼1
Qi ;Mpk
 !Yn
i¼1
e Hi;U

i
 
e H0;
Xn
i¼1
PKi
 !
;
where Qi ¼ H1 IDi
 
;Hi ¼ H3 Ui ;Vi ; IDi ;PKi ; IDR;PKR
 
and H0 = H4(D
*).
C recovers i; IDi ; ri
 
from L1; U

i ;V

i ; ID

i ;PK

i ; ID

R;

PKR; ti; tiPÞ from L3 list, (D*,s,sP) from L4 list. Now, C can
solve GDH0 problem as follows:
abP ¼ W 
Xn
i¼2
riMpk
Xn
i¼1
tiU

i 
Xn
i¼1
sPKi :
Lemma 4. The proposed CLASC scheme is secure during Game
IV, assuming that the CDH intractability assumption holds.
Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random
instance (P,aP,bP) of the CDH problem in G1. Let AII be a
type II adversary who interacts with C as modeled in Game
IV. We demonstrate how C may use AII to solve the CDH
problem, i.e., to compute abP. h
Setup: C generates a master key pair (msk,Mpk) and sends
G1,G2,e,P,Mpk and msk to AII. It chooses a random number
l 6 qReqPK as the challenge identity, where qReqPK is the maxi-
mum number of queries that AII could place to RequestPublic-
Key oracle. AII can make some queries as explained in Game
II, and C answers as in lemma 2, except for the following
queries:
H2 queries: On input ðU;T;R; ID;PK;DÞ; C checks if the
decisional bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman oracle returns 1 on
(U,Mpk,H1(ID),T), and checks e(U,PK) = e(R,P). If it is the
case, C checks the list L2 for the tuple (U,T,R,ID,PK,D,h) for
some value of h. If such a tuple exists, C returns h to AII; other-
wise, C randomly chooses h 2 {0,1}k and updates L2 with
(U,T,R,ID,PK,D,h). C also sends h to AII.
H4queries: On input ðDÞ; C searches L4 for the entry
(D,s,sbP). If no entry is found, C generates a random value s
in Zq. It then inserts the tuple (D,s,sbP) in the list L4. In both
cases, C returns sbP.
Signcrypt queries: For each new query (m,D,IDi, ID0), C
calls the RequestPublicKey oracle on IDi and proceeds as
follows:
 If IDi–IDl; C simply signcrypts the message, getting the
secret value xi from the ExtractSecretValue oracle.
 If IDi ¼ IDl; C does the following:
(1) Generates two random values u; v 2 Zp, sets U= vaP
and calculates T ¼ eðU ;mskQID0 Þ.
(2) Calls H2 on (U,T,R,ID
0,PK0, D) and uses the returned
value (h) to compute V= m ¯ h, where PK0 is obt-
ained by calling the RequestPublicKey oracle on ID0.(3) Deﬁnes the hash value H3(U,V,IDl,PKl, ID
0,PK0) as
H= v1(uP  H0), aborting if such a H3 query has
been responded with a different value before, where
H0 =H4(D). This means that C updates list L3 with
tuple (U,V,IDl,PKl,ID
0,PK0, *,H). Finally, C sets W=
Di+ uaP and returns (U,V,W), where Di=mskH1
(IDl). Note that this is a valid signcryption.
Eventually, AII returns a set of n+ 1 users with identities
fID1; . . . ; IDn; IDRg, the corresponding public keys
PK1; . . . ;PK

n;PK

R
 
; n messages Mi
 n
i¼1, some state infor-
mation D* and a forged aggregate ciphertext
c ¼ U1; . . . ;Un; V1; . . . ;Vn;W
 
. It is required that
IDl 2 ID1; . . . ; IDn
 
. Here too, all indices are the same from
adversary’s viewpoint, and the probability that
IDl 2 ID1; . . . ; IDn
 
is the same for each l. If this event
occurs, the simulation is perfect. Without loss of generality,
we let IDl ¼ ID1. In addition, the forged aggregate signcryp-
tion ciphertext must be veriﬁed by AggregateVerify, namely:
eðW;PÞ ¼ e
Xn
i¼1
Qi ;Mpk
 !Yn
i¼1
e Hi;U

i
 
e H0;
Xn
i¼1
PKi
 !
;
Where Qi ¼ H1 IDi
 
;Hi ¼ H3 Ui ;Vi ; IDi ;PKi ; IDR;PKR
 
and H0 = H4(D
*).
C recovers IDi ; ri
 
from L1,
Ui ;V

i ; ID

i ;PK

i ; ID

R;PK

R; ti; tiP
 
from L3 list, (D
*,s,H0) from
L4 and i; ID

i ; x

i ;PK

i
 
from Lk and by use of these values can
solve CDH problem as follows:
abP ¼ W
 Pni¼1mskriPPni¼1tiUi Pni¼2xi H0
s
:6.3. Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze the efﬁciency of the proposed
method. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme
is the ﬁrst CLASC scheme proposed in the literature. There-
fore, we compare our scheme with Barbosa and Farshim’s
(BF) scheme (used n times). The comparison is performed in
terms of computation complexity and communication load.
The results indicate the efﬁciency of the proposed method.
We summarize the results in Table 1 where the following nota-
tions are used:
TSMulG1 : computation time for a scalar point multiplication
in an additive group (like G1),
TExpG2 : computation time for an exponentiation in a multipli-
cative group (like G2),
TP: computation time of one pairing operation,
Th: computation time of one hash operation,
BF: using Barbosa and Farshim’s scheme for each one of
the senders separately.
In the proposed scheme, we have aggregated the signature
parts of ciphertexts. This makes the communication overhead
of the proposed scheme (n  1)ŒG1Œ bits less than using n times
Barbosa and Farshim’s (BF) scheme. In other words, sending
aggregate ciphertext provides a sufﬁcient amount of efﬁciency
over sending each ciphertext separately. Note that it is not pos-
sible to reduce the communication overhead of a CLASC
scheme to a constant value because two parts of each ciphertext
are needed for decryption. Our scheme uses the signcryption
Table 1 Performance analysis.
Scheme The receiver side computational complexity Communication complexity
Ours ð2nþ 1ÞTh þ ð2nþ 3ÞTP þ nTSMulG1 (n+ 1)ŒG1Œ+ nk
BF ð3nÞTh þ ð5nÞTP þ nTSMulG1 2nŒG1Œ+ nk
Certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption 285algorithm of Barbosa and Farshim’s scheme to signcrypt a
message. Therefore, the computational power needed by each
sender is the same in both schemes. However, on the receiver
side, veriﬁcation of signatures can be performed in a single step
rather than verifying each signature separately. This greatly
reduces the costs of the veriﬁcation process as mentioned in
Table 1.
7. Conclusion
Existing literature on aggregate signcryption covers mainly an
identity-based setting with the well-known key escrow prob-
lem. This paper considers certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption
schemes and deﬁnes a suitable security model for them. A con-
crete construction of a certiﬁcateless aggregate signcryption
scheme is also provided. We prove that this construction is
secure under the gap Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman and computa-
tional Difﬁe–Hellman intractability assumptions in the ran-
dom oracle model.References
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